Why work should be more like the military

It started with TerraCode, my coding agent. I was experimenting with a hierarchy of agents, about eleven of them, each with its own tools and permissions. Agent A can write, agent B can execute, and none of them can do everything: the point was never to build a god agent. That takes coordination, so I spent a long time on skills, notes and system prompts. It was also where I first heard of commander’s intent. I gave my orders to the main agent, the main agent gave orders to each of its subagents, and they passed them on to theirs.

The same work is where arete came into my repositories: one shared purpose set above every agent, and above me too, that every order is weighed against. An agent handed an order that conflicts with it doesn’t carry it out; it argues it through with whoever gave it. The name later went to the Arete Engine.

Then, at a company meeting, they announced a restructure into a tree much like my agents. I asked:

• How will communication go from the bottom to the top?
• What about across?
• Should I really ask my manager to pass a message to a colleague?

It would still be fluid, they said. A few weeks later my manager took a week’s leave, and there was no line of succession, no one to take charge while they were away. One person asked one colleague, someone else asked another, and nobody checked the two answers against each other. The conflict surfaced a few days before a release, and a “bug” sat blocked for two days while we confirmed who had the final say. I raised it in a retro, and the succession line we set up then is still in practice today.

Then the words themselves broke. The first section of a technical design document is the one everything else stands on. Mine was called “What is needed”, and for a new feature it should only ever say what the user is able to do. Whether they are allowed to is a separate discussion. But the document wrote “can” and “able to” as if they meant the same thing:

• The user can unlock multiple devices.
• The user is able to connect multiple devices to multiple areas.

The first line grants a permission, and for a feature this is what was asked for, so it is a given. The question it should have answered was the other one: if they can, are we making them able to? The document added a new field just for unlocking more than one device, an ability the feature should have given them anyway. I only saw it when the implementation went one way and my head had gone the other. By then the mix-up had run from that first section through the rest of the document and into the code. I deleted the TDD and wrote it again.

The second time, I caught it earlier. I was tagged on a pull request that added a deletedAt field to a table that already had archivedAt. The button behind it does one thing for every kind of user: archive them and remove their access. The screen might call that archiving for some users and deleting for others, but the backend state is the same. So I stopped the PR and asked why we needed a second field. Wouldn’t one field confuse the frontend, the developer asked. But we don’t know what our API integrators call it either. They might write remove, or delete, or hapus. The backend holds the state. What a screen calls that state belongs in the documentation: tell integrators which state each endpoint leaves a user in, and they’ll follow.

The stakes. Few organisations pass an order down where a misunderstanding can cost lives.

In September 1944, Operation Market Garden planned to drop “three and a half airborne divisions” near Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. Eisenhower approved it at Brussels on 10 September, and Montgomery set the drop for the 17th, so the airborne army “had but seven days for planning and preparation” (MacDonald, chapter VI).¹²

The words. An order has to mean the same thing to a unit in Japan, in the Middle East or at home, and to people whose first languages differ. A small change in wording can’t be allowed to change the meaning. The Army keeps one dictionary for it, and that dictionary “incorporates North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terms appearing in the glossaries of Army doctrinal publications” (see “Shared words”).²

The structure. With stakes that high, this is still how they do it: a warning order before, the operation order, fragmentary orders as things change, and an after action review once it’s over (see “The operation order” and “When it goes wrong”).

Not a gospel. Doctrine is something to take from, learn from and adapt, not something to copy because an army runs on it. A country can’t lift another country’s laws without checking whether they fit the problem it’s trying to solve, and an army’s methods are no different in an office. Borrowing a method doesn’t make it morally, ethically or structurally right.

Deny first. So read this the way a firewall treats traffic: nothing passes until something lets it through. Every claim about the army names its source at the foot of its block, and anything marked as my reading or my comparison is mine, not doctrine’s.

ADP 6-0 (2019), 1-45: “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.” The definition is the joint one, from JP 3-0.¹

1-46: it “succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation.” It “may include the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state.”¹

1-47: key tasks are “significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state.”¹

1-48: the end state is “a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends.”¹

1-46: commanders choose the format. “If it is longer than a brief paragraph it is probably too long.”¹

1-49: “Commanders personally prepare their commander’s intent. When possible, they deliver it in person.” Delivering it face to face “ensures shared understanding of what the commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points.”¹

1-45: “Each commander’s intent nests within the commander’s intent two levels up.” In planning, it “drives course of action development”; in execution, it “establishes the limits within which a subordinate may exercise initiative.”¹

1-50: “Soldiers two echelons down should easily remember and clearly understand the commander’s intent.” Commanders “collaborate with subordinates to ensure they understand.”¹

1-53: it travels inside mission orders, “directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.”¹

1-45: so subordinates can act “without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.”¹

1-59: it enables disciplined initiative, when subordinates “follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realize their orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation.”¹

1-50: “Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise disciplined initiative in unexpected situations.”¹

Field Marshal William Slim, quoted at the head of the section: the intention “is usually the shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important.”¹

Operation order (OPORD). ADP 1-02: “a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.”²

ADP 6-0, 1-54: an order “should succinctly state the mission, task organization, commander’s intent and concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, and minimum essential coordinating instructions.”¹

Warning order (WARNO). ADP 1-02: “a preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow.” It lets the levels work at once. Parallel planning is “two or more echelons planning for the same operation and sharing information sequentially through warning orders from the higher headquarters prior to the headquarters publishing its operation plan or operation order.”²

Fragmentary order (FRAGORD). ADP 1-02: “an abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.” The dictionary’s abbreviation is FRAGORD; FRAGO is the common short form.²

In person. ADP 6-0, 1-49: “When possible, they deliver it in person.”¹

Beside it in the order, the concept of operations. ADP 1-02 (Army): “a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.” The intent says what and why; the concept says how.²

Checked in FM 5-0 (2005): all three share one skeleton, with “Intent:” at the top of paragraph 3. “A WARNO follows the OPORD format,” and its concept of operations “may be ‘to be determined’ for the initial WARNO.” A FRAGORD repeats the same headings and fills each with “any changes” or “No change.”³

Notes from FM 5-0 (2005), the edition I could open. Later editions (FM 6-0 in 2014, FM 5-0 in 2022) replaced it, so the format details may have shifted since.

Five numbered paragraphs (Figure G-4):³

1. Situation: enemy forces, friendly forces, environment, attachments and detachments, assumptions.
2. Mission: the restated mission. “A mission statement contains no subparagraphs.” ADP 1-02 defines it as “a short sentence or paragraph” with “the elements of who, what, when, where, and why.”
3. Execution: “Intent: State the commander’s intent,” then the concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units and coordinating instructions.
4. Service support: logistics.
5. Command and signal: the chain of command and communications.

Below the five, it nests. Each paragraph has lettered and numbered subparagraphs, and detail moves into attachments: “appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes; enclosures expand tabs” (G-52). Each attachment repeats the five-paragraph format (Figure G-11), and its title names the full chain, for example “TAB C (Highway Regulation) to appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to annex I (Service Support) to OPLAN 02-05.” The aim is the opposite of endless: attachments keep “the base order’s clarity and usefulness by keeping it short,” and “If the information … is brief enough to be placed in the base order or the higher-level attachment, place it there and omit the attachment” (G-53, G-54).³

The newer format, from the Ranger Handbook (TC 3-21.76, 2017) squad OPORD in Table 2-9, splits paragraph 1 differently:⁴

1. Area of interest: “areas outside of the area of operation that can influence your operation.”
2. Area of operations: terrain (in the OAKOC format) and weather, and “how the weather will affect both friendly and enemy forces.”
3. Enemy forces: “composition, disposition, and strength,” recent activities, locations and capabilities, and the enemy’s “most likely and most dangerous course of action.”
4. Friendly forces: the higher headquarters’ mission and intent, two levels up and one level up, and the missions of adjacent units.
5. Attachments and detachments.

Paragraph 2, the mission, is one fixed sentence. The restated mission “identifies WHO, WHAT (the task), WHEN (the critical time), WHERE (usually a grid coordinate), and WHY (the purpose the unit is to achieve).” The handbook’s example: “(Who?) 1st Platoon attacks. (What?) To seize. (Where?) Hill 482 vicinity NB 457371 Objective Blue. (When?) Not later than (NLT) 090500Z December 16 (Why?) In order to (IOT) enable the company’s main effort to destroy enemy command bunker.” Its legend: “IOT – in order to; NLT – not later than.”⁴

The WARNO comes first. WARNOs “increase subordinates’ planning time,” but “a WARNO does not authorize execution other than planning unless specifically stated.”³

The OPORD follows, then FRAGORDs as things change.

Intent “normally does not exceed five sentences” (3-104).³

ADP 6-0 (2019) says “a brief paragraph.”¹

3-104: “In the absence of orders, the commander’s intent, coupled with the mission statement, directs subordinates toward mission accomplishment.”³

Every OPORD lists the levels above it. FM 5-0 says “list”, not “quote” or “restate”, so it doesn’t settle whether the words are kept or rewritten. What the unit writes in its own words is its restated mission (Task 11) and its own intent. Paragraph 1b, friendly forces: “List the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations for headquarters one and two levels up.”³

Planning starts there too. The mission analysis briefing opens with the “Mission and commander’s intent of the headquarters two levels up” (3-100).³

1-62, nested concepts: “each succeeding echelon’s concept of operations is embedded in the other.” Commanders keep their concept “consistent with both their commander’s intent and that of the next two higher commanders.”³

It looks down as well as up. The intent “must be understood and remembered by subordinates two echelons down” (3-104), and paragraph 1a describes the enemy “in terms of two enemy echelons below yours.”³

FM 3-19.4 (Army military police), Appendix D: “Include the mission, the commander’s intent, and the concept of operations for HQ one and two levels up.” “Include”, again neither verbatim nor rewritten.⁵

Marine Corps OCS, FGHT 1004: at the bottom of the tree, intent is passed on, not written. “Squad and team leaders do not develop commanders’ intent sections of orders. However, they must communicate their higher commander’s intent provided in the order they receive.” Its example of the higher mission is a one-line summary in the squad leader’s words: “Higher: 1st platoon is clearing enemy forces IVO Area of Operations (AO) D1 in order to prevent attacks on adjacent friendly supply routes.”⁶

The handover itself is a translation step. Orders may come “at conversational speed, or slightly faster,” and “a squad leader must be prepared to copy a great deal of information in a short amount of time.” For that, “There are no official USMC abbreviations … Develop your own abbreviations.”⁶

The services don’t even split intent the same way. The Marine course gives three elements: “P- Purpose ‘WHY’”, “M- Method ‘HOW’” and “E- Endstate.”⁶

ADP 6-0 (Army) gives purpose, key tasks and end state, and puts the how in the concept of operations instead.¹

The Ranger Handbook settles it: each level rewrites from the order above, paragraph by paragraph. In its squad OPORD (Table 2-9):⁴

• Enemy forces: “the enemy situation in higher headquarters’ OPORD (para 1c) forms the basis for this. Refine it by adding the detail your subordinates require.”
• Terrain: “Use the OAKOC from higher HQ OPORD. Refine it based on your analysis of the terrain in the AO.”
• Friendly forces: “get this information from paragraphs 1d, 2, and 3 of the higher headquarters’ OPORD,” then “state the mission of the higher unit (two levels up)” and “state intent two levels up,” and the same one level up.
• Mission: “Who, what (task), when, where, why (purpose) from higher HQ maneuver paragraph.”

So the higher intent is stated at each level, and the rest is refined. Each hop is a rewrite with added detail, and every rewrite is a chance to drift.

Shattuck (2000): four battalions wrote OPORDs, and the company commanders wrote their own and briefed them back. When the situation changed, the battalion commanders judged the responses matched their intent “in only 17 of the 32 episodes (53 percent).” Shattuck counted six of those matches as misses, “11 of 32 episodes, or 34 percent.”⁷

He found the battalion intent statements “provided sufficient information.” The misses came from the company commanders. “Unsuccessful company commanders generally did not refer to the battalion commander’s statement of intent.”⁷

Shared words failed too: “battalion and company commanders disagreed concerning doctrinal terms.” If they “do not have the same definition of ‘delay,’” the subordinate “may make an erroneous decision.”⁷

Names change by branch. A company-sized artillery unit is a battery, and in armor and air cavalry it is a troop; a battalion-sized armor or air cavalry unit is a squadron.⁸

From FM 5-0 (2005).

WARNO. Right after the commander’s planning guidance, “the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a WARNO that contains, as a minimum” the “approved unit mission statement” and “The commander’s intent” (3-110). “A WARNO follows the OPORD format,” and may carry “The higher headquarters’ mission” and “The commander’s intent statement” (G-19).³

Each level issues its own WARNO. Figure 4-2, “Parallel Planning”, shows a battalion working through its planning steps and sending warning orders down. Meanwhile the company and the platoon each run their troop-leading procedures, and step two at both is “Issue a Warning Order.” “Leaders do not wait for more information. They issue the best WARNO possible with the information at hand” (4-20).³

OPORD. Lists the mission, intent and concept “for headquarters one and two levels up” (Appendix G, paragraph 1b).³

FRAGO. “FRAGOs include all five OPORD paragraph headings,” each with “either new information or ‘no change.’ This ensures that recipients know they have received the entire FRAGO” (G-20). They “refer to previous orders,” and when changes pile up, “the higher headquarters issues a new OPORD” (G-21).³

A FRAGO is a mission too. “Frequently, leaders receive a mission in a FRAGO over the radio” (4-14). Receiving the mission is the first step of the troop leading procedures, and issuing the order is the seventh.³

My reading: FM 5-0 never says a level passes a FRAGO on as a FRAGO. A FRAGO from above starts the next level’s own planning, and what goes down is that level’s order.

Verbal orders are the riskiest hop. They “offer the advantage of being passed quickly, but risk important information being overlooked or misunderstood,” so they are “usually followed up by written FRAGOs” (G-23).³

At the bottom of the tree, the order is usually spoken. “Small unit orders are normally issued verbally and supplemented by graphics and other control measures” (4-49). The leader summons subordinates to receive it, ideally at a point with “a view of the objective”; where that isn’t possible, they “use a sand table, detailed sketch, maps, and other products” (4-50).³

FM 5-0 doesn’t say why “normally”: 4-50 says where the order is given, not why it’s spoken.

From FM 5-0 (2005) and ADP 1-02 (2018). MDMP and METT-TC aren’t parts of the OPORD. They’re how each level produces its own.

Two processes, split by level. “The MDMP is more appropriate for headquarters with staffs.” “At lower tactical echelons, commanders do not have staffs. Leaders at company level and below use TLP” (1-5).³

MDMP, the military decision-making process: “an interactive planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a courses of action, and produce an operation plan or order.”²

It has seven steps: receipt of mission, mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis, COA comparison, COA approval, and orders production. It is “detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming” (3-4).³

TLP, troop leading procedures: “a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation.” It has eight steps: receive the mission, issue a warning order, make a tentative plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise and refine.²

Both start from the order above. On receiving the mission, the leader works to “understand the higher commander’s concept of operations and intent for his unit” and “obtains clarification on any portions of the higher headquarters plan as required” (4-14).³

Below company level, no new intent. “Typically, Army leaders below company level do not issue a commander’s intent. They reiterate the intent of their higher and next higher commander” (4-49).³

METT-TC is what each level analyses: “mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations,” the Army’s “mission variables.”²

In TLP it is the first look on receiving a mission, and it “form[s] the basis of their initial WARNO” (4-15). “The order and detail in which Army leaders analyze the factors of METT-TC is flexible” (4-16).³

Where METT-TC lands in the order (my reading of the formats, not a quoted rule): the enemy, terrain, weather and civil considerations fill paragraph 1, Situation. The mission becomes paragraph 2, and time goes into the coordinating instructions.

ADP 6-0, 3-35: “Information needs to flow up and down the chain of command as well as laterally to adjacent units and organizations.”¹

4-77: “Information flows vertically within the chain of command, but the organization should not limit its flow to the chain of command. Information also must flow laterally among adjacent, supported, and supporting units. Information flows informally and unofficially—between individuals according to personal relationships—as well as within formal channels. Informal channels provide important redundancy.”¹

The neighbors are written into the order. Planning starts by analyzing the higher order “to establish where the unit mission fits into the missions of higher and adjacent headquarters,” and to “determine how their mission and those of adjacent units contribute to achieving the commander’s intent” (FM 5-0, 3-58).³

The squad OPORD’s friendly forces paragraph (Table 2-9, 1d(2)), “Mission of adjacent units: state locations of units to the left, right, front, and rear. State those units’ tasks and purposes and say how those units will influence yours.” The squad leader gets it from above: “Obtain this information from higher HQs OPORD.”⁴

The order itself goes sideways. When it uses a standard distribution list, it must “also show distribution to reinforcing, supporting, and adjacent units, since that list does not normally include these units” (FM 5-0, Figure G-4).³

Then the leaders talk directly. The Ranger Handbook’s adjacent coordination checklist (Table 2-20): “Immediately after the operation order or mission briefing, the platoon or squad leader should check with other platoon and squad leaders who will be operating in the same areas.” Only when a leader doesn’t know who else is out there does the staff step in: “he should check with the S-3 … The S-3 can help arrange this coordination, if necessary.” They exchange each unit’s mission and size, times, routes, fire control measures, frequencies and call signs, passwords, recognition signals, and “any information that the unit may have about the enemy.”⁴

And again before the order goes down: “If time allows, Army leaders make final coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters before issuing the order” (FM 5-0, 4-48).³

ADP 6-0, 4-7: “At all levels, the second in command is the commander’s principal assistant.” “Usually, at company through brigade echelons, the executive officer is the second in command.” The first circumstance 4-10 lists for the second in command is the “Temporary absence of the commander.”¹

4-11: “Officers who are second in the chain of command may assume duties as delegated, either explicitly or by standard operating procedures (SOP), when the commander is temporarily absent from the command post or resting.” Even sleep is planned for: “A commander’s sleep plan should include delegating authority to the second in command during selected times to give the commander time to sleep.” And for a longer absence, “the second in command may assume command temporarily and make decisions that continue operations in accordance with the commander’s intent and policies.”¹

4-12, for when the commander is gone for good: “Commanders may be killed, wounded, medically incapacitated, or relieved of command. In these situations, the second in command normally assumes command.” Where that isn’t obvious, “the operations order specifies succession of command.”¹

4-13: “Seconds in command must be able to assume command at any time. They must stay informed of the situation. Commanders inform their second in command of any changes to their visualization or intent.”¹

It is written into every order, in paragraph 5, command and signal. FM 5-0’s annotated format: “Identify the chain of command if not addressed in unit SOPs” (Figure G-4).³

The squad OPORD (Table 2-9, 5a): “Succession of command: state the succession of command, if not covered in the unit SOP.”⁴

It goes all the way down. In a platoon, the platoon sergeant is “second in succession of command” and “leads the patrol in the leader’s absence” (1-6). The handbook’s example squad warning order names the line to the last man: “This is the SL, BTL, ATL, and RTO”: the squad leader, the two team leaders, then the radio operator (Table 2-8).⁴

From FM 5-0 (2005) and the Ranger Handbook (2017).

Briefing back is a kind of rehearsal. “Company and smaller sized units use five types of rehearsals,” and the first two are the confirmation brief and the backbrief (4-53).³

The confirmation brief comes “immediately after receiving the order”: “subordinate leaders brief their superior on the order they just received. They brief their understanding of the commander’s intent, the specific tasks they have been assigned and their purposes, and the relationship of their tasks to those of other elements conducting the operation. They repeat any important coordinating measures specified in the order” (4-54).³

It follows the OPORD: “Normally after receiving an OPORD, leaders are required to give a confirmation brief to their higher commander to ensure they understand the higher commander’s concept of operations and intent for his unit” (4-14). At headquarters with staffs it comes straight after the order is briefed: “The commander and staff conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately afterwards” (3-202).³

The backbrief comes once the subordinate has a plan. It “differs from the confirmation brief in that subordinate leaders are given time to complete their plan.” They “explain their actions from start to finish of the mission,” one after another, “with all leaders going over their tasks” (4-55).³

It is the cheap one: “Backbriefs require the fewest resources and are often the only option under time-constrained conditions” (4-55).³

My reading: the confirmation brief checks the words (did I hear you right?), and the backbrief checks the plan (here’s how I’ll do it; does it fit?).

No one briefs back the warning orders at 0900 and 1030. A WARNO is notice to start planning, and the schedule’s briefs come only after the OPORDs.³

The Ranger Handbook makes the warning order’s brief optional rather than absent. The last line of its example squad WARNO: “If time permits, have your subordinate leader’s confirmation brief you on the information that was put out to ensure understanding” (Table 2-8).⁴

The time is set aside on purpose. The rule of thumb for leaders at all levels is “to use no more than one-third of the available time for planning and issuance of the OPORD. Leaders allocate the remaining two-thirds of it to subordinates” (4-19).³

What comes back up can change the order above: “Feedback from unit backbriefs and rehearsals may also initiate changes to the plan” (1-38).³

That is what they are for. Backbriefs and rehearsals “are essential to ensure those responsible for execution have a clear understanding of the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations” (3-3).³

The order books them. The squad OPORD’s coordinating instructions carry a time schedule: “state time, place, uniform, priority of rehearsals, confirmation briefs, inspections, and movement” (Table 2-9, 3g).⁴

In a group or one to one, in person or not: “Confirmation briefings can be done collaboratively with several commanders at the same time, or with single commanders. They may be performed face to face or by VTC” (FM 5-0, 3-202).³

In turn: “During a confirmation brief rehearsal, key leaders sequentially brief the actions required during an operation” (2-13).⁴

On the ground, where possible: “If possible, backbriefs are performed overlooking subordinates’ AOs, after they have developed their own plans” (FM 5-0, 4-55).³

The subordinate can ask for one too. Before going out, the platoon or squad leader “coordinates with the company commander or platoon leader to confirm the mission and operational plan, receive last minute changes,” and the first item on that checklist is “Mission confirmation brief” (Table 2-17).⁴

The commander’s side: ADP 6-0 lists “Backbriefs and rehearsals” among the ways commanders establish command presence, and says how to listen: “Commanders employing the mission command approach ask questions without second-guessing their subordinate’s performance unless absolutely necessary.”¹

After every OPORD, at every level, as in the schedule above (FM 5-0, 4-14 and 4-19).³

After a FRAGORD, then again after the plan. “Patrol leader rehearsals are conducted twice; right after a FRAGORD (confirmation brief) and again after subordinates develop their own plan” (2-13).⁴

After a WARNO, if time permits (Table 2-8).⁴

Before every move. The mounted patrol brief’s timeline puts it just before departure: “(e) Rehearsals/test fires. (f) Back brief/confirmation brief from key leaders. (g) Start point (SP)/departure” (Table 13-1).⁴

When time runs short, the backbrief is the one that stays: it is “often the only option under time-constrained conditions,” and “When time is available, backbriefs can be combined with other types of rehearsals” (FM 5-0, 4-55).³

ADP 6-0 opens the section “Use doctrinally correct terms and graphics” with Ferdinand Foch: “A doctrine of war consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject; second, in a common way of handling it.”¹

3-61: “Language used when communicating should be simple, clear, and easily understood. An understanding of common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms contributes to the simplicity and clarity essential to mutual understanding and shortens the amount of explicit communication needed to convey or explain an order or plan. Doctrinal terms and graphics enable shared understanding by communicating in a commonly understood way.”¹

Leaving the dictionary is allowed, with a duty attached: staffs “must ensure that subordinates and adjacent units understand nonstandard terms and graphics” (3-61).¹

The dictionary is ADP 1-02. Its introduction: “When communicating instructions to subordinate units, commanders and staffs from company through corps echelons should use this publication as a dictionary of operational terms and military symbols.”²

Every definition names its owner: “For each term and definition, a proponent publication is cited in parentheses after the definition.” And it is kept current: “Changes to terminology occur more frequently than traditional publication media can be updated,” so the online Army Dictionary “is updated monthly.”²

The verbs in a mission statement are defined. 9-1: “A task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals or organizations.” “The tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commanders want to achieve.”²

Four of them, from chapter 1:²

• Secure: “preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.”
• Seize: “taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force.”
• Clear: “remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.”
• Retain: “ensures that a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use.”

Where one word does carry two meanings, the dictionary says whose is whose. “Seize” has a joint one, labelled for the Department of Defense (DOD), “(DOD) To employ combat forces to occupy physically and to control a designated area,” and an Army one, “(Army) A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force.” The rules: “Each joint definition is preceded by ‘(DOD)’,” and “The Army definition is preceded by ‘(Army)’ if the term also has a joint definition that differs from the Army definition.”²

My reading: a dictionary isn’t enough on its own. Shattuck’s battalion and company commanders “disagreed concerning doctrinal terms” (see “Where intent gets mistranslated”). The confirmation brief is where that disagreement is meant to surface.

The briefs are the first catch: what comes back up “may also initiate changes to the plan” (FM 5-0, 1-38). Rehearsals “may identify areas that require more supervision” (4-52).³

Leaders keep checking until the start: “Throughout TLP, Army leaders monitor mission preparations, refine the plan, perform coordination with adjacent units, and supervise and assess preparations” (4-51).³

Most of it is decided before it happens. The order settles in advance what news matters, what the options are, and when the decisions fall.

What to report. A commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) is “an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making.” CCIRs are “Always promulgated by a plan or order,” and kept few: “The fewer the CCIRs, the easier it is for staffs to remember, recognize, and act on each one” (ADP 6-0, 3-20).¹

What to do if. A branch is “a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action)” for “anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions.” “Although anticipating every possible threat action is impossible, branches anticipate the most likely ones. Commanders execute branches to rapidly respond to changing conditions” (FM 5-0, 1-67).³

When to decide. A decision point is “an event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision,” and “will be associated with CCIR” (FM 5-0, 3-170).³

How the routine goes. “Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders frequently make rapid decisions to meet operational requirements” (ADP 6-0, 1-103).¹

When the order and the situation stop matching, the subordinate reports first: “If time permits, subordinates attempt to communicate their new situation and recommended course of action to their commander” (ADP 6-0, 1-64).¹

If they can’t, the intent decides: “If doubt exists about whether to contact their commander or depart from orders and act to seize a fleeting opportunity, subordinates should act, if they can do so within their commander’s intent” (1-64).¹

From above, the correction is a FRAGO, and a spoken one is “usually followed up by written FRAGOs” (FM 5-0, G-23).³

Judgment is reviewed. Commanders “assess the judgment of their subordinates’ risk taking, either at the time of decision, if time permits, or during after action reviews” (ADP 6-0, “Accept Subordinates’ Risk Taking and Errors”).¹

Some mistakes are carried by the commander. A climate that encourages initiative “requires commanders to accept risk and underwrite the good faith mistakes of subordinates in training, before the unit is committed to combat” (1-65).¹

The line is the intent: “Commanders do not underwrite subordinate mistakes when a subordinate operates outside of the commander’s intent or displays poor judgment that endangers life or mission accomplishment. Nor do commanders tolerate a subordinate who repeatedly makes the same mistakes, does not learn, or violates the Army Ethic.” Telling the two apart “is part of the art of command.”¹

Outside the intent has a test rather than a definition. Before departing from orders, subordinates weigh “Whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronizing the overall operation” and “Whether the action will further the higher commander’s intent” (1-63). Doing nothing isn’t safe either: subordinates are “required, not just permitted, to exercise disciplined initiative in the absence of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or threat presents itself” (1-61).¹

ADP 6-0 doesn’t say what happens next. Its nearest word is a quote from Field Marshal Carver: “If it is necessary for a commander to interfere constantly with a subordinate, one or the other should be relieved.”¹

Relief for cause. AR 600-20, 2-18a: “When a higher ranking commander loses confidence in a subordinate commander’s ability to command due to misconduct, poor judgment, the subordinate’s inability to complete assigned duties, or for other similar reasons, the higher ranking commander has the authority to relieve the subordinate commander. Relief is normally preceded with formal counseling by the commander or supervisor unless such action is not deemed appropriate or practical under the circumstances.”¹⁰

It isn’t one person’s call. Any commander may suspend a subordinate, but “final action to relieve an officer from any command position will not be taken until after written approval is obtained from the first GO [general officer] … in the chain of command of the officer being relieved.” The relief also goes on the officer’s record: AR 623-3 governs “the administrative review of relief reports” (2-18a).¹⁰

Disobedience is a different matter. AR 600-20, 4-2: “All personnel in the Army are required to strictly obey and promptly execute the legal orders of their lawful seniors.”¹⁰

Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice punishes anyone who “(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties,” “as a court-martial may direct.”¹¹

My reading: for a commander, misreading the intent is a matter of judgment and confidence, handled by counseling and, at worst, relief. A court-martial is for refusing a lawful order or neglecting a duty, not for understanding it differently.

The after action review. “An after-action review (AAR) is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables soldiers to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses” (TC 25-20, chapter 1). It runs from the “Commander’s mission and intent (what was supposed to happen)” to a “Summary of recent events (what happened)” and a “Discussion of key issues (why it happened and how to improve)” (figure 1-2).¹³

It isn’t a hearing: “An AAR is not a critique. No one, regardless of rank, position, or strength of personality, has all of the information or answers” (chapter 4). It runs from the bottom up: “Squad and platoon AARs are held before the execution of formal company and higher echelon AARs” (chapter 1).¹³

How often intent is misread at all: Shattuck’s 11 in 32 (see “Where intent gets mistranslated”).

Disclaimer: From this point onwards, when referring to a ‘company’, it’s always referring to the business term, not the military unit.

Communication. None of this is only about the army. Every story in the background was a failure to communicate at work: a restructure that didn’t say how messages travel up or across, a week’s leave with no one in charge, “can” read as “able to”, and “archive” nearly turning into “delete”. None of them needed a war to go wrong. An office doesn’t lose lives over a misread order, but it loses days, documents and code.

Speed. Development doesn’t wait for the plan to finish. Work starts before planning is done, code is pushed while some requirements are still in question, and a change can arrive when a feature is almost finished. One of the principles behind the Agile Manifesto is “Welcome changing requirements, even late in development.”¹⁴

The army works the same way, and has the tools for it. Each level starts planning from a warning order, because “Leaders do not wait for more information” (FM 5-0, 4-20). A late change comes down as a fragmentary order, and when the plan stops fitting, subordinates act on the intent (see “When it goes wrong”). Fast work leaves no time to ask what was meant, so the meaning has to travel with the order.³

Rules from outside. Neither an army nor a company writes all its own rules. An army fights under the law of war. Its commanders “are legally responsible for war crimes they personally commit, order committed, or know or should have known about and take no action to prevent, stop, or punish,” and must “train their Soldiers on the law of land warfare” (AR 600-20, 4-21).¹⁰

A company that handles personal data answers to laws such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The controller, whoever decides why and how the data is processed (Article 4(7)), “shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with” the regulation’s principles: “accountability” (Article 5(2)). Below it, “any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the processor, who has access to personal data, shall not process those data except on instructions from the controller” (Article 29).¹⁵

My reading: in both, responsibility sits at the top, and the rule still reaches whoever does the work. An order doesn’t change what the law allows.

Accountability at every level. “Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do. However, commanders subdivide responsibility and authority and assign portions of both to various subordinate commanders and staff members. In this way, a proper degree of responsibility becomes inherent in each command echelon” (AR 600-20, 2-1b).¹⁰

We are trying to find the good in the military's strategies and methods, not become one. Below are problems found in their implementations that I believe can be overcome. They are possibilities to solving it, not definitive answers, each is a way the problem might be handled by the people.

Overhead. The army’s formats take time to write: a five-point order, a warning order before it, briefs after it. A small team that writes all of that for every ticket could spend longer on paperwork than on the work. One possibility: cut the format down, as the army does when time is short. Planners take “no more than one-third of the available time” and leave the rest to subordinates (FM 5-0, 4-19), and the backbrief, which needs “the fewest resources”, is “often the only option under time-constrained conditions” (4-55). If writing out the details still takes too long, a transcription or a language model can draft them, as long as someone reads the draft afterwards.³

Obedience. Using the army’s order formats at work could bring the army’s image with them: the manager gives an order, and the team carries it out without question. That would undo the point of this essay, since commander’s intent exists so that people can think for themselves. One possibility: borrow the intent, not the rank. Doctrine itself says subordinates are “required, not just permitted” to use initiative within the intent (ADP 6-0, 1-61), and the backbrief is where disagreement goes back up.¹

Fear of owning a decision. Even with the intent written down, people without a title may still hand a decision to someone who has one, because they’re afraid of being blamed if it goes wrong. Then the intent doesn’t speed anything up. One possibility: say out loud that honest mistakes won’t be punished, and review them in retros, not as a search for who to blame. Most mistakes have more than one cause, so no one person should carry all of it. The army’s own promise has limits: commanders “underwrite the good faith mistakes of subordinates in training, before the unit is committed to combat” (1-65), and not mistakes made outside the intent.¹

Ritual. A team can fill in the template every time and still not read what it says. In Shattuck’s study the written intent statements were good enough, and the company commanders who misread the intent “generally did not refer to” them. Writing the intent isn’t enough if the people receiving it don’t use it. One possibility: don’t count the order as received until it has been briefed back. The confirmation brief checks that the receiver understood the order, and the backbrief checks that their plan fits it.⁷

No enforcement. In the army, an order is backed by law: the Army’s command policy (AR 600-20) requires soldiers to obey, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice punishes those who don’t (see “When it goes wrong”). A company has nothing like that. An employee who doesn’t like a habit can ignore it or leave, so a habit only lasts if the people doing it agree with it. One possibility: treat each habit as something the team agrees to, starting with one, so it runs on trust rather than rules.